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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SELEY-RADTKE V. HOSMANE: THE STANDARD OF PROOF
REQUIREMENT IN A PURELY PRIVATE DEFAMATION
ACTION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL ASSERTING A COMMON
LAW CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE IS PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE.
By: Makeda Curbeam
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a party seeking to overcome
a common law conditional privilege in a purely private defamation suit must
do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 450
Md. 468, 474, 149 A.3d 573, 576 (2016). The court also held that evidentiary
issues not addressed by the court of special appeals are not subject to review
by the court of appeals. Id. at 510, 149 A.3d at 598 (citing Md. R. 8-
131(b)(1)). Further, the court held that prejudicial evidence irrelevant to a
claim is not admissible at trial. Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 513-14, 149 Md. at
600.
Katherine Seley-Radtke ("Seley-Radtke") and Ramachandra Hosmane
("Hosmane") were professors at the University of Maryland, Baltimore
County ("UMBC"). Following allegations that Hosmane sexually assaulted
one of his graduate students, Brahmi Shukla ("Shukla"), UMBC officials
conducted an investigation and determined that Hosmane violated UMBC's
sexual harassment policy. On January 1, 2010, Hosmane resigned from his
position on the condition that the findings from the UMBC investigation
would not be publicized. Later, Hosmane and Shukla entered into a
settlement agreement in which Hosmane paid Shukla $10,000 in return for
Shukla dropping any civil and criminal claims against Hosmane.
On December 10, 2010, Hosmane filed a complaint against UMBC in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. While this action was pending,
Hosmane submitted a Maryland Public Information Act ("MPIA") request to
obtain various documents from UMBC. As a result of this request, Hosmane
received several documents, including emails authored and sent by Seley-
Radtke stating that Hosmane stole documents from the chemistry department
and that he was a "nutcase," among other things. On July 6, 2012, Hosmane
filed a complaint against Seley-Radtke in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County asserting that Seley-Radtke made false statements about Hosmane in
the emails. On April 4, 2013, Hosmane filed an amended complaint, adding
UMBC and the State as defendants, and the circuit court subsequently
consolidated the cases.
On April 29, 2014, Hosmane's case against UMBC and Seley-Radtke
proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to trial, Hosmane filed a motion in limine to
suppress the unredacted emails and testimony relating to the settlement
agreement, which was denied. At the close of trial, Seley-Radtke argued that
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she had a common law conditional privilege, and the circuit court agreed,
ruling that she was entitled to this privilege. Hosmane requested that the
judge instruct the jury that the standard for overcoming such a privilege is by
a preponderance of the evidence. However, the judge instructed the jury that
Hosmane must prove his defamation action by clear and convincing
evidence. The jury found in favor of Seley-Radtke, and Hosmane timely
appealed the decision.
On February 24, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed
the decision of the lower court, holding that the court erred in instructing the
jury on the proper standard of proof needed to overcome a conditional
privilege. Seley-Radtke petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining both
federal and state precedent regarding the standard of proof. Seley-Radtke,
450 Md. at 482-83, 149 A.3d at 581. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Supreme Court noted that a privilege existed for citizens to criticize the
government and public officials. Id. at 483, 149 A.3d at 582 (citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964)). A decade later, the Court
held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., that private individuals are
distinguishable from public officials for purposes of defamation actions.
Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 487, 149 A.3d at 584-85 (citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)).
Following Gertz, the Court of Appeals of Maryland "substantially
changed the Maryland common law regarding defamation actions." Seley-
Radtke, 450 Md. at 488, 149 A.3d at 585 (quoting Telnikoff v. Matusevitch,
347 Md. 561, 593, 702 A.2d 230, 246 (1997)). In Jacron Sales Co. v.
Sindorf, the court adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard for
establishing fault in purely private defamation actions. Seley-Radtke, 450
Md. at 488-91, 149 A.3d at 585-56 (citing Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276
Md. 580, 596-97, 350 A.2d 688, 697-98 (1976)).
Next, the court of appeals discussed common law conditional privileges.
Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 491-92, 149 A.3d at 586-87. A common law
conditional privilege allows for a defendant to escape liability for an
actionable defamation claim if the statement advances issues that are greater
than the plaintiffs reputational interest. Id. at 492, 149 A.3d at 587 (citing
Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1978)).
However, such a privilege can be lost if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant abused their privilege by knowingly making false statements.
Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 493, 149 A.3d at 588 (citing Piscatelli v. Van
Smith, 424 Md. 294, 307-08, 35 A.3d 1140, 1147-48 (2012)).
While the court of appeals has held that the applicable standard of proof
in a purely private defamation action is by a preponderance of the evidence,
it has never addressed the standard of proof for overcoming a common law
conditional privilege. Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 496, 149 A.3d at 589. The
court looked to other jurisdictions and found the preponderance of the
evidence standard more compelling. Id. at 498-501, 149 A.3d at 590-93. In
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this case, the court of appeals determined that the balance of protecting
private individuals from defamation and utilizing common law conditional
privilege is best served with a standard of preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 502-03, A.3d at 593.
The court of appeals then briefly turned to the issue of whether it could
review evidentiary matters not addressed by the lower appellate court. Seley-
Radtke, 450 Md. at 507-11, 149 A.3d at 596-99. Ultimately, it determined
that such matters not addressed by the intermediate court are not preserved
for review by the court of appeals. Id. at 510, 149 A.3d at 598. As to the
evidentiary matters that were addressed by the court of special appeals, the
court held that evidence is considered relevant if it helps to make the
determination of an action more or less probable. Id. at 512, 149 A.3d at 599
(citing Md. R. 5-401). The court affirmed the intermediate court's guidance
and found that the admission of the evidence at issue was highly prejudicial
and not relevant to the defamation claims, and thus not admissible in trial.
Seley-Radtke, 450 Md. at 513-14, 149 A.3d at 600.
The dissent argued that there should be a clear and convincing standard of
evidence used to overcome a common law conditional privilege. Seley-
Radtke, 450 Md. at 514-15, 149 A.3d at 600-01. The dissent considered that
if it is determined that a conditional privilege exists, then there are inevitably
public interests at stake. Id. at 514, 149 A.3d at 600. The dissent concluded
that those who come forward to report wrongdoings should be rewarded with
a higher standard, that is, a clear and convincing standard, to overcome the
conditional privilege. Id. at 515, 149 A.3d at 601.
In Seley-Radtke, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
preponderance of the evidence standard is required to overcome a common
law conditional privilege in a purely private defamation action. The court
also held that it may not review issues not addressed by the lower courts and
that prejudicial and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. This decision
reinforces the primary consideration when reviewing a purely private
defamation action - the protection of private individuals. A preponderance
of the evidence standard puts a lower burden on private individuals, who
bear a greater risk of their reputation, career, and social life being ruined than
a public official. In addition, Maryland practitioners should ensure that all
evidentiary matters are addressed and preserved before the lower courts;
otherwise the Court of Appeals of Maryland will not review them.
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